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The subject is a large-sounding one, but because of a single
fact its scope is narrow. That fact is that without the permission
of Congress there could be no such taxation. The fact is, there-
fore, an act giving the permission conditionally, so that the treat-
ment of the subject resolves itself into an examination only of
the condition and an ascertainment, as far as may be, of its scope
and dimensions.
As far as may be. This qualification of the desired ascertain-
ment is made advisedly so as not to arouse the hope of the student
of the question that even in a majority of instances he will be
able to write after his solution the quod erat dernonstrandurn of
academic days, which comfortable conclusion he may reasonably
append to his opinions upon many problems of law propounded
by his clients. The reason is not far to seek, for immediately
upon the submission of the question as to whether or not a given
State tax upon national bank shares is a discrimination, we enter
upon a fog-region of judicial definition, distinction, counter-
definition and dissent in comparison with which any twilight-zone
of constitutional law loses any distinctive terrors of uncertainty
which it may have been thought to possess. That this statement
is not exaggerated appears from the fact that from a recent
decision of the Supreme Court holding invalid a State tax upon
national banks, four of the nine members of the Court dissented,
the minority opinion commencing with the somewhat unusual
assertion that "a grievous wrong" was done by the decision to
the State which had sought to impose the tax. In a word, it
behooves the judge or lawyer whose opinion is invoked upon a
case in point to sound the fog-horn and proceed at the most on
half speed.
Coming now from the general to the concrete, we find that the
only factors of any degree of substance whatever are two in
number and that after leaving the last we are upon the open sea.
These are, first, the proposition above mentioned, that without the
consent of the Federal government, a State may not impose any
tax upon a national bank.'
"Upon what principle is the power of a State to tax the power
of a national bank, without the consent of Congress, denied? The
'Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438.
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answer to this question was fully given by Chief Justice Marshall
in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wh. 316; Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449. Briefly stated, the argument was this:
Two distinct sovereignties, the State and the United States, exer-
cise jurisdiction within the same territorial limits. Each has the
power of taxation. This power is in its nature absolute and
unlimited. Power to tax is power to destroy. Given to the State
the power to tax any of the instrumentalities which the United
States creates for the exercise of its jurisdiction, and the former
may impede, if not wholly stop, the latter in the discharge of its
duties as sovereign. Hence, by necessary implication, the abso-
lute exemption from state taxation of any of the instrumental-
ities-and among them are national banks-which the United
States creates for the exercise of its powers and the discharge
of its duties."
The second factor is that the requisite consent of Congress is
given by R. S. U. S., §5219, which is as follows:
"Nothing herein (national banking act) shall prevent all
the shares in any association from being included in the
valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder
of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of
the State within which the association is located; but the
legislature of each State may determine and direct the
manner and place of taxing all the shares of national
banking associations located within the State, subject only
to the two restrictions, THAT THE TAXATION
SHALL NOT BE AT A GREATER RATE THAN IS
ASSESSED UPON OTHER MONEYED CAPITAL
IN THE HAND OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS OF
SUCH STATE, and that the shares of any national bank-
ing association owned by non-residents of any State shall
be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and
not elsewhere. Nothing herein shall be construed to
exempt the real property of associations from either State,
county or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according
to its value, as other real property is taxed."
'
'The national banking act of 1864, in addition to the restrictions now
imposed upon State taxation of national bank shares, declared that "the
tax so imposed tinder the laws of any State, upon the shares of any
of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate
imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under the authority
of the State where such association is located." In the reenactment of
this statute in 1868 (R. S. U. S., §5219), the standard was changed from
State bank shares to "other moneyed capital," etc.
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For the purposes of this inquiry, only the first of these "two
restrictions" will be considered, Congress having worded its
meaning as to the second and as to the real estate of a national
bank with a clearness which cannot be said to pervade the sec-
tion. Had its draughtsman been given, even for a moment, a
seer's vision-could he have foreseen the conflicting constructions,
the apparently endless succession of State laws to be submitted to
his standard, the reams of printed matter devoted exclusively to
the discussion of what he probably meant, and, most serious of all,
could he have foreseen the uncertainty of State legislatures and
taxing officers extending sometimes to the imperilling and some-
times to the derangement of an entire scheme of State taxation,
due only to the looseness of his phraseology-it goes without
saying that he would surely have recast the section and would
have prescribed a limit of State taxation which would have been
a limit indeed and not a predicate for a guessing contest.
But the section was so written and Congress has not attempted
to elucidate its meaning by amendment since its passage in i868.
What, then, is the meaning of the words, "other moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens"?,
On these few words hang the law of the question and inci-
dentally a half century of discussion. It is not practicable to
present within the limitations of a single article in a Law Journal
all of the decisions in point. We must content ourselves with
certain of the leading cases and endeavor to gather from them
the law of the subject as it is to-day.
In First National Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, the basal
law governing the relations of a State to a federal agency was set
forth with characteristic clearness by Mr. Justice Miller, who,
after mentioning the repeated re-affirmations by the court of
McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, said:
"But the doctrine has its foundation in the proposition
that the right of taxation may be so used in such cases as
to destroy the instrumentalities by which the government
proposes to effect its lawful purpose in the States, and it
certainly cannot be maintained that banks or other corpo-
rations or instrumentalities of the government are to be
wholly withdrawn from the operation of State legislation.
* * * * They (the national banks) are subject to the
laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of
business far more by the laws of the State than of the
Nation. All their contracts are governed and construed
by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property,
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their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be
sued for debts, are all based on state law. It is only when
the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging
their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitu-
tional. We do not see the remotest probability of this, in
their being required to pay the tax which their stock-
holders owe to the State for the shares of their capital
stock, when the law of the Federal Government authorized
the tax."
Accordingly a tax by the State of Kentucky upon the shares of
stock of a national bank was pronounced valid, the court declining
to consider the question of "other moneyed capital" upon the
ground that it had not been sufficiently raised in the lower court.
The court held further that while a State cannot tax the capital
of a national bank, a tax upon shares is not a tax upon capital.
The following propositions touching "other moneyed capital"
appear to be established by decisions of the same court:
First, the purpose of the statute was to protect national banks
from unfriendly discrimination by the States in the exercise of
their taxing power-that is, discrimination quoad other moneyed
capital. This, however, applies only to moneyed capital in the
hands of individuals and excludes it in the hands of corporations."
Second, Section 5219 does not forbid discrimination between
national banks, but only as between such banks and State banks
or other moneyed capital in the hands of private individuals.'
Third, If State and national banks are treated equally from
the standpoint of assessment, there is no illegal discrimination.
6
There seems to have been no attempt at judicial definition of the
phrase until 1886, when the Supreme Court in Mercantile National
Bank v. New York, supra,--the leading case in point to-day-
after instancing several cases of noncompeting moneyed capital,
said:
"The terms of the Act of Congress, therefore, include
shares of stock or other interests owned by individuals in
all enterprises in which the capital employed in carrying
on its business is money, when the object of the business
is the making of profit by its use as money. The moneyed
capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in
securities by way of loan, discount or otherwise, which are
'Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19.
'Mercantile National Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138.
'Merchants National Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461.
6First National Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205.
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from time to time, according to the rules of the business,
reduced again to money and re-invested. It includes
money in the hands of individuals employed in a similar
way, invested in loans or in securities for the payment of
money, either as an investment of a permanent character,
or temporarily with a view to sale or re-payment and
re-investment. In this way the moneyed capital of indi-
viduals is distinguished from what is known generally as
personal property."
This read well, but as a definition seems to have proved inade-
quate, for its enunciation was contemporaneous with a beginning
of a succession of cases asking a definition by the same court of
the word "similar"-"money in the hands of individuals employed
in a similar way." That inquiry has continued to the present
time, and the prediction may safely be made that it will and in
the nature of things must continue as long as our forty-eight
States enact statutes not heretofore substantially passed upon or
until Congress amends section 5219 in such a manner as to place
its meaning beyond doubt.
"Similar." Is the business of a trust company similar to-
note, not the same as-that of a bank? The court in the Mercan-
tile Bank case holds that it is not. It was claimed for the bank
that the New York statute expressly exempted from taxation in
the hands of individual citizens numerous kinds of moneyed
capital, aggregating more than one and a half billion dollars, while
national and State bank shares were subjected to taxation upon
their full actual value, less the real estate owned by the bank.
The exemptions were as follows:
i. Shares of stock in the hands of individuals deriving income
or profit from their capital, or otherwise, not including
trust companies and State and National Banks.
2. Trust companies and life insurance companies.
3. Savings banks and the deposits therein.
4. Certain municipal bonds of the City of New York.
5. Shares of stock in corporations created by States other
than New York in the hands of individual shareholders,
residents of New York.
It was argued that these exemptions brought the case within
the first of the two restrictions of section 5219 and within the
ruling in Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689, as making the tax upon
shares of national bank shares an unfair discrimination against
that class of property. In the Boyer case the court had held that
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its former decisions do not sustain the proposition that national
bank shares may be subjected under the authority of a State to
local taxation where a very material part, relatively, of other
moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens within the
same jurisdiction is exempted from such taxation, the court
saying, "Capital invested in national bank shares was intended
to be placed upon the same footing of substantial equality in
respect of taxation by State authority, as the State establishes
for other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens,
however invested, whether in state bank shares or otherwise."
The court, however, held that the record in the Mercantile
Bank case showed no unfair discrimination. For its reasons,
reference must be made to the opinion, the substance of which is
contained in the following paragraph:
"'Moneyed capital' does not mean all capital the value
of which is measured in terms of money. In this sense
all kinds of real and personal property would be embraced
by it, for they all have an estimated value as the subjects
of sale. Neither does it necessarily include all forms of
investment in which the interest of the owner is expressed
in money. Shares of stock in railroad companies, mining
companies, manufacturing companies, and other corpora-
tions, are represented by certificates showing that the
owner is entitled to an interest, expressed in money value,
in the entire capital and property of the corporation, but the
property of the corporation which constitutes its invested
capital may consist mainly of real and personal property,
which, in the hands of individuals, no one would think of
calling moneyed capital, and its business may not consist of
any kind of dealing in money or commercial representatives
of money."
The court said that trust companies are not banks in the com-
mercial sense of that word, although they receive money on
deposit and invest it in loans and so deal, therefore, in money and
securities.
This ruling was followed in Jenkins v. Neff, 186 U. S. 230,
another trust company case, in which the court went so far as to
hold that no power to loan, discount or purchase commercial
paper was given trust companies by a New York statute author-
izing them to exercise the powers conferred on individual banks
and bankers by another statute providing that such banks and
bankers may "take, receive, reserve and charge on every loan
or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other
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evidence of debt, interest at the rate of 6% per annum; and
such interest may be taken in advance."
Without stopping to enlarge upon what seems to the writer
the patent inaccuracy of this proposition, it would appear to
follow necessarily therefrom that the trust companies of New
York have, unless subsequent State legislation has expressly
conferred it, no power to loan money in any of the methods
prescribed. Yet we know as a fact that their transactions of
this nature average millions of dollars monthly.
Another interesting feature of the ruling is that the court
qualified materially the rule of "competitive moneyed capital,"
which it had formulated in cases like First National Bank v.
Chapman, supra, and substituted in lieu thereof "limited compe-
tition," which was declared permissible. "It is essential," said
the court, "if the law of the State is to be declared invalid under
the limitations expressed in the United States statute, that the
enactment of the legislature shall evidence a disposition to evade
or override the spirit of the limiting statute; and this is clearly
not the case where it provides for equal taxation upon its own
state banks, and where it does not require its trust companies,
which, it may be conceded, come into limited competition with
the investors in the shares of national banks, to invest their
capital in such a way as to necessarily exempt them from taxation
upon a portion of their capital stock."
So, then, a discrimination in favor of competing moneyed
capital is not obnoxious to section 5219, provided the competition
is limited. The court would have contributed materially to a
clearer understanding of the subject if it had drawn the line of
limit.
But further, it is provided by section 21 of the Federal Reserve
Act that the Reserve Board may, among other things,
"grant by special permit to national banks applying there-
for, when not in contravention of State or local law, the
right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, or registrar
of stocks and bonds, under such rules and regulations as
the said board may prescribe"-
in other words, may become a federal trust company.
Now, as to national banks availing themselves of this permis-
sion, what becomes of the competition or limited-competition test?
Manifestly, it would seem, it cannot be invoked, for the competi-
tion is direct and unlimited. The great national banks of the
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country can more than hold their own with the largest trust
companies chartered by State authority. The only conclusion
appears to be that, as between such banks and trust companies,
both doing business on "moneyed capital in the hands of indi-
viduals," the same rule and limit of State taxation must obtain
and, if a lower rate is prescribed for the latter, or an exemption
or deduction allowed them which is denied the banks, the legisla-
tion to those ends or any of them must be pronounced to be in
conflict with the Act of Congress and invalid.
Upon the general subject of discrimination, the leading case
decided by the Supreme Court within the last decade is that of
San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge, 197 U. S. 70, in which
it was held that such discrimination results from the taxation of
national bank shares under the Political Code of California at
their market value, while the construction given by the highest
State court to the provisions for the taxation of the "property"
of State banks and other moneyed corporations does not require,
although property is defined by the Constitution of California as
including "franchises," that the assessing officers shall include in
the assessment all the intangible elements of value which form
part of the market and selling value of the stock.
Four members of the court dissented from the judgment, con-
curring in the minority opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer, the first
sentence of which, as hereinbefore noted, contains an expression
of his belief that by the judgment "a grievous wrong is done to
the State of California."
A few words as to deductions. The earlier decisions bravely
maintained the proposition that the taxation of national bank
shares by a State statute, without permitting the shareholder to
deduct from their assessed value the amount of his bona fide
indebtedness, as in the case of other moneyed capital, is a dis-
crimination forbidden by the Act of Congress. Evansville
National Bank v. Britton, 1O5 U. S. 322; Supervisors v. Stanley,
Id. 305; Hills v. Exchange National Bank, Id. 319. In the first
named case the court said:
"The Act of Congress does not make the tax on personal
property the measure of the tax on bank shares in the
State, but the tax on moneyed capital in the hands of the
individual citizens. Credits, money loaned at interest and
demands against persons or corporations are more purely
representative of moneyed capital than personal property,
so far as they can be said to differ. * * * * The rights,
credits, demands and money at interest mentioned in the
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Indiana statute, from which bona fide debts may be
deducted, all mean moneyed capital invested in that way."
Later cases, however, like First National Bank v. Chapman,
supra, and Commercial National Bank v. Chambers, 182 13. S.
556, have materially lessened the force of the early deliver-
ances, the court in the Chapman case holding that the fact
that the owner of what is termed "credits" in the State statute is
permitted to deduct certain classes of debts from the sum of those
credits, upon the remainder of which taxes are to be assessed,
while the national bank stockholder is not permitted to deduct
his debts from the value of his shares, does not in itself constitute
an illegal discrimination. Again the line grows dim.
And dimmer still. In People v. Weaver, IOO U. S. 539, it was
held that a statute of New York which permitted a debtor to
deduct the amount of his debts from the valuation of all his
personal property, including moneyed capital, except his bank
shares, taxes those shares at a greater rate than other moneyed
capital and is, therefore, void as to the shares of national banks.
But in Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373, decided
December I, 1913, the court, after twelve months' consideration,
held that provisions in the New York tax law imposing a flat
rate on shares of all banks, both State and national, without the
right of exemption (deduction?) in case of the indebtedness of
the owners, does not discriminate against national banks and is
not invalid under section 5219. The interested reader must
himself locate the distinction which the court says exists between
this and the Weaver case, videlicet, in the State statutes pertinent
to the two cases.
New York and Kentucky have been among the States the
most persistent and the most successful in the effort to whittle
down section 5219 and to make it a bar to State taxation in
name only. As has been seen, New York bore her part in the
early battles but must share her recent honors with Kentucky.
In Covington v. First National Bank, 198 U. S. lOO, a statute
of the latter State, passed in i9oo, taxing shares of national
banks from the years 1893 to 19oo, was held void as to those
portions which were retroactive and valid as to taxes imposed
thereafter. Not disconcerted, that State made up another case,
Citizens National Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 443, in which
it was held that the retroactive features of the same statute
do not, so far as the shares of resident shareholders are con-
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cerned, operate to discriminate against the bank nor to deny due
process of law, further, that as no non-resident stockholders
were parties complainant, the judgment of the State court sus-
taining the tax would be affirmed. Mr. Justice White was con-
strained to dissent because he thought, in substance and effect,
"the retroactive tax now upheld is a tax on the bank and its
assets and is therefore void."
The latest reported decision is that of Lacy v. Mc.Cafferty, 215
Fed. 352, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held in June of this year that the assessment of property
of national banks at its full value, while other classes of property
are assessed at only sixty per cent of their fair cash value, does
not entitle a national bank to relief in equity. Note the reason-
"it must further appear," says the court, "that the assessing
officers made the erroneous valuation not accidentally or inad-
vertently, but systematically and intentionally with respect to
one or more classes of property, with the intention of imposing
upon that class an undue burden of taxation."
It seems to the writer that this is a case of res ipsa loquitur for
the opposite conclusion. Just why, upon a conceded difference
of forty per cent. in the assessments, the national banks should
have to prove a prescribed mental condition on the part of the
assessors-that this difference was not inadvertent but inten-
tional-before relief can be granted even in "equity," passes his
comprehension. When section 5219 was enacted, it must have
been thought to possess teeth, but if so, they have practically
disappeared under the skillful dental surgery of the tax-hungry
States. The grinders have ceased because they are few.
What is an "intentional and systematic" discrimination, if a
difference of forty per cent. in assessment is not so? In First
National Bank v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548, it was said, "accidental
inequality is one thing, intentional and systematic discrimination
another." The court declined to enjoin an assessment because
the proper time had not arrived. "Probably," it added signifi-
cantly, "it will be made with caution after this case."
After this series, necessarily incomplete, of distinctions and
sub-distinctions, how clear and virile are the words of Mr. Justice
Bradley in Supervisors v. Stanley, supra, in an opinion dissenting
from that of the majority only upon the ground that it did not
reach the heart of the difficulty-did not declare the true intent
of Congress-did not then (1882) forever establish the principles
of the law and place them not merely beyond reasonable doubt,
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but beyond the ingenuity of State-taxing officers looking long-
ingly upon a fair but forbidden field!
The opinion is as follows, the italics being those of the writer
of the opinion:
"I dissent from the judgment of the court in all these
cases, for the reason that, in my opinion, the State laws
authorizing the capital stock of national banks to be taxed,
without allowing any deductions for the debts of the
stockholders, where such deduction is allowed in relation to
other moneyed capital, are void in toto so far as relates to
national banks. To hold the laws valid except as to those
who are actually indebted, and actually claim the benefit
of the deductions, and actually set it up in a suit brought
by the bank for relief, is practically to render the condi-
tion of the act of Congress nugatory, and to deprive the
national banks and their stockholders of its protection.
The tax though laid on the stockholders is required to be
paid by the bank itself, which must pay without deduction
unless the shareholders give the bank notice of the amount
of their debts. This is a most ingenious expedient to avoid
such deductions altogether. The probability, that not one
in ten of the shareholders will ever have notice of the
assessment in time to make the claim, and the natural
reluctance they would have (if they had notice) to lay
the amount of their debts before a board of bank officers,
will effectually secure the State from claims for deduction.
And that was, no doubt, the object of the law. But this
unequal operation of it, in its practical effect, might not
be sufficient to render it void. It is void, in my judgment,
because it makes no exception, but is general in its terms,
subjecting to taxation the stock of national banks without
the privilege of deducting debts. Denying to it operation
and effect as to those who desire to claim the benefit of the
deduction, and giving it effect as to all others, is to tear
a portion of the law out by the roots. It is not like a case
where a portion of a law, which may be separated from the
rest, can be declared invalid, without affecting the
remainder of the law; nor like the case of a general law
which the Legislature has power to make, but from the
operation of which some individuals may have a legal or
constitutional exemption, which they can plead in their
defense; but it is wrong in foi'm, wrong in toto. The
Legislature had no authority to make the capital of
national banks taxable except in the same manner as other
moneyed capital of the State. The practical iniquity of
the law is seen in this, that it affects the value of all the
stock whoever holds it. As the law stands it acts as a
prohibition against the purchase of stock by those who
owe debts, and they constitute a considerable portion of
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every community. It does not help the validity of the law
for us to declare that it is pro tanto void, and, in fact,
make a new law for the State. Its validity must be
decided by its actual form and terms. If these cannot
stand, the law is void."
It must now be evident that there has been a great drift in the
law of the subject since the enactment of the Statute in 1868.
It must be equally evident to those who think that national bank
shares are entitled to a greater measure of protection from inten-
tionally unfriendly and discriminatory State taxation than they
now receive that they cannot hope to obtain this otherwise than
through Congressional action. What form should this take?
Replies without number might be made to the question, all of
them doubtless worthy of consideration. The most effective
solution of the problem, however, in the judgment of the writer,
is suggested by Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion in Boyer v.
Boyer, supra:
"As the Act of Congress does not fix a definite limit as
to the percentage of value beyond which the States may
not tax national bank shares, cases will arise in which it
will be difficult to determine whether the exemption of a
particular part of moneyed capital in individual hands is
so serious or material as to infringe the rule of substantial
equality."
If Congress will amend section 5219 and fix, say, sixty per cent.
as a definite limit beyond which the States may not tax national
bank shares, the end will be attained, the clouds through which
we have been groping our way will disappear and only the mem-
ory of them as interesting illustrations of legal casuistry will
remain. If, to be more specific, the first of the "two restrictions"
of section 5219 be amended and reenacted so as to read
"that the assessment of such shares shall not be at a greater
rate than sixty per cent. of their book value,"
there will be an end of construction, for there will be nothing to
construe. All that will remain will be obedience to the supreme
law of the land.
Of course, when the amending bill is introduced, there will be
protests both loud and deep-forty-eight of them, perhaps. But
these ought not by their mere number and volume to drown the
voice of justice-the justice which has been so long lost sight of;
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the justice which is predicated upon the elementary requirements
of the jurisprudence of taxation, uniformity and equality; the
justice which denies altogether the reason and righteousness of a
system of taxation which lays its hand upon those forms of prop-
erty which are visible and within reach, and arbitrarily assesses
other subjects of taxation, receiving the same governmental pro-
tection, at fifty, forty or thirty per cent. of their value, or, with
blinking eye, permits them to escape altogether.
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